PAUL AUDI
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PUBLICATIONS:
“Causation, Coincidence, and Commensuration.” Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
Abstract. Paper. The official Phil Studies version is available here.
“Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization.” Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Abstract. Paper. The official PPR version is available here.
“A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding.” To appear in Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, eds., Grounding and Explanation (Cambridge University Press).
“Primitive Causal Relations and the Pairing Problem.” Ratio 24:1, March 2011, pp. 1-16.
Abstract. Paper. The official Ratio version is available here.
“Causation, Coincidence, and Commensuration.”
What does it take to solve the exclusion problem? An ingenious strategy is Stephen Yablo's idea that causes must be commensurate with their effects. Commensuration is a relation between events. Roughly, events are commensurate with one another when one contains all that is required for the occurrence of the other, and as little as possible that is not required. According to Yablo, one event is a cause of another only if they are commensurate. I raise three reasons to doubt that this account solves the exclusion problem successfully. First, it leaves a mystery about what determines a particular's causal capacities. Second, because there are two ways of construing coincidence between particulars, a dilemma arises: either the solution to the exclusion problem is threatened, or the account of coincidence loses an attractive feature concerning ontological economy. Third, even if we assume the commensuration constraint, a plausible principle about overdetermination seems to regenerate the exclusion problem.
“Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization.”
According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. It therefore seems to provide a way around the causal exclusion problem. There is reason to doubt, however, that the subset account can achieve both tasks. The problem arises when we look closely at the relation between properties and causal powers, specifically, at the idea that properties confer powers on the things that have them. If realizers are to be ontically prior to what they realize, then we must regard the conferral of powers by properties as a substantive relation of determination. This relation of conferral is at the heart of a kind of exclusion problem, analogous to the familiar causal exclusion problem. I argue that the subset account cannot adequately answer this new exclusion problem, and is for that reason ill-suited to be the backbone of a non-reductive physicalism.
“A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding.”
This paper defends a particular version of the idea that there is a non-causal relation of determination, grounding, often expressed by the phrase 'in virtue of'. This relation corresponds to certain non-causal explanations, including those philosophers give, e.g., in saying that a statue has its aesthetic properties in virtue of its physical properties, or that a thing has its dispositional features in virtue of its categorical features, or that a person has a reason to believe that p in virtue of her perceptual experiences. Indeed, it is the fact that there are such explanations, together with the fact that their correctness cannot be underwritten by any causal relation obtaining between the relata, that makes it incumbent on us to recognize grounding. In this paper, I sketch my own view of grounding and show how it differs from other views on the subject, and then address various objections to the notion of grounding.
“Primitive Causal Relations and the Pairing Problem.”
There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid--they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility of primitive causal relations, a possibility I defend. This topic is of importance beyond the philosophy of mind; the possibility that causal relations might sometimes hold brutely is of general metaphysical importance. I close with a discussion of what Cartesians should say about embodiment, and how that bears on issues of mental causation.